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BACKGROUND: Enhanced primary care models have diffused slowly and shown uneven results. Because their
structural features are costly and challenging for small
practices to implement, they offer modest rewards for
improved performance, and improvement takes time.
OBJECTIVE: To test whether a patient-centered medical
home (PCMH) model that significantly rewarded cost savings and accommodated small primary care practices was
associated with lower spending, fewer hospital admissions, and fewer emergency room visits.
DESIGN: We compared medical care expenditures and
utilization among adults who participated in the PCMH
program to adults who did not participate. We computed
difference-in-difference estimates using two-part multivariate generalized linear models for expenditures and
negative binomial models for utilization. Control variables
included patient demographics, county, chronic condition
indicators, and illness severity.
PARTICIPANTS: A total of 1,433,297 adults aged 18–64
years, residing in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia, and insured by CareFirst for at least 3 consecutive months between 2010 and 2013.
INTERVENTION: CareFirst implemented enhanced feefor-service payments to the practices, offered a large retrospective bonus if annual cost and quality targets were
exceeded, and provided information and care coordination support.
MEASURES: Outcomes were quarterly claims expenditures per member for all covered services, inpatient care,
emergency care, and prescription drugs, and quarterly
inpatient admissions and emergency room visits.
RESULTS: By the third intervention year, annual adjusted total claims payments were $109 per participating
member (95 % CI: −$192, −$27), or 2.8 % lower than
before the program and compared to those who did not
participate. Forty-two percent of the overall decline in
spending was explained by lower inpatient care, emergency care, and prescription drug spending. Much of the
reduction in inpatient and emergency spending was explained by lower utilization of services.
CONCLUSIONS: A PCMH model that does not require
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practices to make infrastructure investments and that
rewards cost savings can reduce spending and utilization.
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INTRODUCTION

Numerous models have been proposed for enhancing primary
care and improving care coordination, while pursuing the triple
aim of greater access, lower costs, and improved quality. These
models range from patient-centered medical homes (PCMH) to
accountable care organizations (ACOs).1 Many small physician
practices, which provide most of the primary care services
delivered in the United States, struggle to meet the requirements
of even a standard PCMH model, citing large investments in
infrastructure such as electronic medical records, retraining,
workflow redesign, ongoing certification, and additional care
coordination personnel, which can cost up to $100,000 per
physician by some estimates.2–4 Some observers have argued
that policy initiatives aimed at promoting these models could
unintentionally lead to greater consolidation of physician practices and spell the end of small-scale practices.5
Most PCMH programs to date have relied on per-member
per-month (PMPM) case management fees to finance the
additional resources needed.6–9 While such models are suited
to both large and small practices, they may not be sufficient to
cover the increased practice costs necessary to perform PCMH
functions or explicitly reward performance. In at least one
PCMH program, practices were given access to additional
staffing from a community health team, potentially benefitting
smaller practices.10 Other PCMH programs have required
third-party PCMH accreditation or have paid practices up front
to meet certification criteria as a PCMH.11–13 Practices that do
not receive financial support to become PMCH-certified are
otherwise disadvantaged.
The Comprehensive Primary Care initiative (CPCI) required substantial PMPM payments from multiple payers,
and offered shared savings based on quality and cost
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performance, but was not limited to practices with PCMH
recognition.14 The initiative required changes in care delivery
to enhance access, care planning, chronic care management,
care coordination, and patient engagement. Despite some initial promising results, in the second year practices on average
showed no savings in Medicare spending after accounting for
the PMPM.15
Other PCMH initiatives have relied on modified fee-forservice payments that embed quality and spending incentives.16–21 Still other initiatives have relied on global budgets
and Btwo-sided^ financial risk, meaning that practices face the
prospect of financial reward or penalty, depending on whether
spending targets—and potentially quality targets—are or are
not met.22 One recent example is the Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) program, which tied rewards to
both quality metrics and spending targets, and which was
directed at larger multispecialty groups or integrated systems
that were in a strong position to bear financial risk.23 Small
primary care practices, however, are not able to take on the
same financial risk as large practices.
We studied the CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield’s PCMH
program, which began in 2011, and has over 1 million
enrollees in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and northern
Virginia as of 2016. In contrast to other PCMH programs
nationwide, the CareFirst program did not require large upfront investments by participating practices, a feature that
made the program particularly well suited for adoption by
small, independent practices. By 2013, just over 4000 primary
care physicians and nurse practitioners had joined the program, representing more than 81 % of all primary care providers in the plan’s networks in Maryland, northern Virginia,
and DC.24 This number of participating primary care physicians compares favorably with the 2222 providers nationwide
who have participated in the CPCI program.

Study Setting
For statistical validity, CareFirst grouped smaller practices
together to create Bpanels^ or clusters of approximately 10
physicians. Because performance was measured and rewarded
at the panel level, each practice had an incentive to communicate with other practices in the same panel. Primary care
practices with more than 20 physicians were subdivided into
panels of 10. From 2011 to 2013, the number of participating
physicians grew steadily, from 3476 to 4037, while the number of attributed CareFirst members increased from 987,000 to
1,169,000.
Importantly, the program did not require external certification by a PCMH-accrediting organization, although it did
contain the core PCMH attributes defined by AHRQ: comprehensive and coordinated care through an array of nurse coordinators, along with hospital transition, chronic, complex,
behavioral, and substance abuse care managers; accessible
services through same-day appointments and 24/7 phone triage; patient-centeredness through care plans developed by
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nurses, clinicians, and patients together; and quality through
objective performance metrics required for earning shared
savings.25
CareFirst offered participating practices a one-time 12 %
increase in fee-for-service payments for services provided by
the practices immediately upon joining the program, which
averaged to approximately $10.34 per member per month.
Panels were not put at financial risk, but were offered additional financial rewards—up to 80 % of annual fee-for-service
billings—depending on their joint quality of care and spending
growth performance each year. In addition, providers could
receive separate payments for developing and maintaining
care plans for selected patients. The insurer provided nurse
coordinators and lists of members likely to benefit from care
coordination. Nurse coordinators and physicians identified
and focused on subsets of each panel’s 50 most severely ill
patients. The nurse coordinators developed care plans, coordinated with families, and provided follow-up support.
CareFirst also provided an electronic portal through which
panels could monitor their financial and claims-based quality
performance and compare the efficiency of referrals across
specialists and hospitals. The detailed information captured in
the portal was based on members’ medical claims with a 1month lag so that providers could track their cost performance
continuously throughout the year. Using this portal, physicians
were able not only to view information on specialist costs to
inform referrals, but also to obtain patient-level reports to
identify gaps in care and review care plans, with notes written
by care coordinators with input from providers engaged in a
patient’s care.
About 70 % of eventually participating members were
attributed to participating panels in 2011, the first year of
operation. Thus, the program was not fully implemented at a
single starting point. In addition to delays in physician participation, program features were rolled out over the first 2 years.
First, nurse care coordinators had to contact roughly 400
participating panels, an effort that was hampered by high
initial rates of turnover in care coordinator staff. Second, the
electronic physician portal was introduced in 2012, and was
underutilized until program consultants were hired to assist
practices in the use of the performance data through the portal.
For these reasons, our evaluation of the CareFirst PCMH
program is best understood as an effectiveness study of a
large-scale program that was faced with the usual challenges
of real-world implementation.
We examined whether a member’s attribution to a participating PCMH panel was associated with lower total payments
and lower payments for inpatient care, emergency department
visits, and prescription drugs. Given the program’s focus, we
hypothesized that its impact on payments would be larger for
patients with chronic conditions. We also tested whether the
program was associated with reductions in inpatient admissions and emergency room visits. We evaluated results in all 3
years of the program’s operation. We focus our discussion on
outcomes in the third year, since the literature has shown that
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PCMH programs typically take a few years to reach maturity
and produce measurable effects.

METHODS

Study Population
The study population included all adults aged 18 to 64 years
who were covered by CareFirst for at least 3 consecutive
months between 2010 and 2013. Individuals were included
in the analysis if CareFirst held their medical and prescription
drug claims. Individuals who had prescription drug coverage
outside CareFirst were excluded. Monthly claims data were
collapsed to quarterly observations to smooth monthly fluctuations but still capture seasonal trends. Online Appendix 1
illustrates our sample construction. The study was approved
by the George Mason University institutional review board.

Definition of Intervention and Comparison
Groups
Practices were able to join the program beginning January 1,
2011. Insured members were attributed to the participating
primary care panel considered most responsible for that member’s primary care, based on the previous 12 months of evaluation and management claims office and preventive care
visits in an outpatient setting.

whether the individual had a chronic condition, and illness
burden. In addition to these covariates, all models included
quarter and county fixed effects.
We also weighted each year of treatment and control observations to the baseline year for the treatment group in order to
control for any compositional changes over time.27 The
weighting models were estimated using boosted regression,
as implemented in the "twang" package in R.28 We estimated
two-part multivariate generalized linear models with a log link
and gamma distribution to isolate the association between a
member’s attribution to a participating primary care practice
and quarterly spending.29 For inpatient admissions and emergency room visits, we estimated zero-inflated negative binomial or hurdle models with the same set of control variables.
We clustered standard errors at the panel level.
Members who were continuously attributed to a participating
panel were defined as the intervention group. We refer to this
group as Balways PCMH^ (N = 592,886 individuals). Because
some physician panels joined the program as early as January
2011, a member could be attributed to participating practices for
as many as 3 years during our study period. Thus, we measured
the association of spending with program participation in the
first, second, and third years. Some members were ineligible for
attribution, either because their primary care provider was in a
non-participating practice or because their employer declined to
have its employee members participate in the program. The
members who were never attributed to the PCMH model during
our study period constituted the comparison group.

Data
Medical and prescription drug claims data were provided by
CareFirst. For each member and quarter, we summed the
allowed amounts for medical and prescription drug claims.
We also included members’ out-of-pocket payments. We calculated quarterly allowed amounts separately for inpatient
care, emergency department visits, and prescription drug
claims. In addition, we calculated the number of emergency
department visits and inpatient admissions per member-quarter. Chronic conditions were measured using diagnoses in the
claims data. The illness burden was measured as a prospective
risk score using DxCG Intelligence software (Verisk Health,
Waltham, MA) based on the previous 12 months of claims,
and was provided for each member-month by the insurer.26

Statistical Approach
The member-quarter was our unit of analysis. The primary
dependent variable was the total claims allowed amount. We
used a difference-in-differences estimator to capture changes
in participant spending relative to changes in non-participant
spending. We addressed observed differences between treatment and comparison members with treatment-on-the-treated
propensity score weighting. The weighting models predicted
the probability of being in the treatment group in the base year
as a function of demographic characteristics, whether the
covered individual was an employee or dependent, group size,

Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, we defined a second, more expansive
intervention group of members who were attributed for at least
one quarter, but may not have been continuously attributed to
a participating panel thereafter. This second group, referred to
as Bever PCMH^ (N = 804,758 individuals), included individuals with less exposure to the PCMH program than the
Balways PCMH^ group.

RESULTS

The characteristics of members in the Balways PCMH^ intervention group were similar to those in the treatment group in the
baseline year after weighting (Table 1). The covariate balance
from propensity score weighting across all years, as measured
by the standardized mean differences for each pair of covariates,
is shown in Online Appendix 2. Balance was achieved with all
100 covariate pairs having a standardized difference of less than
0.10. Continuously attributed members, the Balways PCMH^
intervention group, had lower spending in the baseline quarter
than the comparison group of members who were never attributed (Table 1; $966 vs. $1107, p < 0.001). Expenditures for
prescription drugs ($131 vs. $108, p < 0.001) were higher, but
emergency room ($44 vs. $46, p = 0.039) and inpatient care
($114 vs. $135, p < 0.001) were lower.
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Table 1 CareFirst Enrollee Descriptive Characteristics – 2010 Quarter 1, Propensity Score-Weighted

Total allowed amount ($)
Inpatient allowed amount ($)
ED allowed amount ($)
Rx allowed amount ($)
Inpatient admissions per 1000
ER visits per 1000
Age (years)
Female (%)
Illness burden score
Fully insured group (%)
Employee (%)
Small employer (%)
No chronic conditions (%)
One chronic condition (%)
Two or more chronic conditions
(%)
Maryland resident (%)
Member count (unweighted)

Comparison mean (95 %
CI)

Ever PCMH mean (95 %
CI)

p value

Always PCMH mean (95 %
CI)

p value

1107 (1082–1131)
135 (127–142)
46 (44–48)
108 (106–109)
146 (143–149)
21 (20–21)
44 (44–44)
53 (52–-53)
88 (88–89)
45 (45–45)
67 (67–67)
16 (16–16)
39 (39–40)
25 (25–26)
35 (35–35)

1000 (980–1021)
120 (112–128)
46 (44–47)
130 (129–132)
135 (132–139)
20 (19–21)
43 (43–43)
58 (57–58)
92 (91–93)
44 (44–45)
66 (66–66)
17 (17–17)
39 (39–39)
25 (25–25)
36 (36–37)

<0.001
0.007
0.672
<0.001
<0.001
0.154
<0.001
0.545
<0.001
0.034
<0.001
<0.001
0.029
<0.001
<0.001

966 (946–987)
114 (106–121)
44 (42–45)
131 (129–133)
129 (126–133)
19 (18–20)
43 (43–43)
56 (56–56)
89 (88–90)
44 (44–45)
67 (67–-67)
17 (16–17)
39 (39–39)
25 (25–25)
36 (36–36)

<0.001
<0.001
0.039
<0.001
<0.001
0.007
<0.001
0.519
0.126
0.017
0.121
0.014
0.034
0.116
<0.001

44 (44-44)
628,539

79 (79–79)
804,758

<0.001

79 (79–79)
592,886

<0.001

ED emergency department, Rx prescription drug

Continuously attributed members recorded lower expenditures by the second and third years relative to the comparison
group (Table 2). There were no statistically significant differences in total expenditures between the intervention and comparison groups in the first program year. For the third year, we
estimated a reduction in total spending per member of $109
(95 % CI: −$191.82, −$26.96), equivalent to a decline of 2.8
% relative to base year. The total 3-year savings was $297 (95
% CI: −471.41, −123.69) per PCMH participant relative to
comparisons. Figure 1 illustrates the regression-adjusted
means for both the treatment and comparison groups for all
4 years (baseline and the 3 intervention years). Full regression
Table 2 Total Expenditures – Annual Marginal Effects
All members

Members with
chronic
conditions

Year-on-year
change in total
allowed amount
($)

Always
PCMH

Ever
PCMH

Always
PCMH

Intervention year 1

−38.4
[−105.83,
29.09]
−149.8†
[−201.32,
−98.26]
−109.4‡
[−191.82,
−26.96]
21,008,072
3864

−16.3
[−69.13,
36.44]
−126.57‡
[−144.95,
−108.20]
−159.9‡
[−182.18,
−137.72]
24,641,055
4000

−58.3
[−183.06,
66.41]
−235.9‡
[−344.22,
−127.53]
−143.7†
[−250.04,
−37.42]
10,459,946
5080

Intervention year 2
Intervention year 3
Member-quarters
2010 Annualized
spending per
member ($)*

Two-part multivariate models controlling for: quarter and county fixed
effects, age, gender, number of chronic conditions, illness burden, fully
insured group, dependent status, employer size, and county
* Calculated as 4 times the intervention group’s first quarter spending in
2010
95 % confidence intervals in brackets

†p <0.01, ‡p <0.001

results for the expenditure models are provided in Online
Appendix 3.
We estimated analogous average reductions for year 3 of
$23 in inpatient spending (95 % CI: −$35, −$11), $8 in
emergency department spending (95 % CI: −$11, −$5), and
$14 in prescription drug spending (95 % CI: −$20, −$9)
(Table 3). The percentage reductions relative to 2010 were
5.0 % for inpatient care, 4.5 % for emergency care, and 2.7 %
for prescription drugs.
Among individuals with chronic conditions (Table 2), the
absolute reduction in total spending in year 3 was greater than
that for all members ($144 vs. $109), but as a percentage of
annualized spending it was equivalent (2.8 %). Twenty percent
of the total reduction was due to inpatient spending, which
declined by $32 (CI: −$56, −$9) by year 3 (Table 4). Also, by
year 3, reductions in emergency room spending were larger for
individuals with chronic conditions than for all individuals
($10 vs. $8), as was prescription drug spending ($18 vs.
$14); neither difference was statistically significant between
PCMH participants with chronic conditions and all
participants.
The program was associated with reductions in inpatient
admissions by the third year (Table 5). In year 3, members
experienced 2.4 (95 % CI: −2.8, −2.2) fewer inpatient admissions per 1000 on average, representing a 2.4 % reduction. They
also had 9.9 (95 % CI: −9.0, −7.7) fewer emergency room visits
per 1000 in year 3, a decline of 3.2 %. Full regression results for
the utilization models are provided in Online Appendix 4.

Robustness Results
When we expanded the intervention group to also include
Bever^ members who were attributed to participating practices
only intermittently, the estimated impact of the program was in
the same direction but larger in magnitude than in the main
models using Balways^ participants. BEver^ robustness results
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Figure 1 Regression-adjusted mean total allowed amount, PCMH, and comparison

are shown in column 2 of Table 2 for total allowed amounts,
with full results in Online Appendix 5.

DISCUSSION

Implementation of the CareFirst PCMH program was associated with lowering of costs by year 2, and 2.8 % lower total
payments by year 3. This compares favorably to most early
PCMH programs with quality and spending incentives, which
observed small or no effects on spending.30 Other PCMH
programs have also been shown to reduce overall expenditures, inpatient care, or emergency room care, but they required meeting the full catalogue of PCMH accreditation
criteria or substantial up-front investments, which are particularly onerous for small physician practices.31–33

The magnitude of the reduction was greatest for members
with chronic conditions, consistent with other studies of coordinated care interventions.34 The gross decline in spending is
comparable to that of the AQC program.35 By comparison,
CMMI’s combined CPCI demonstrations lowered payments
for medical services and/or utilization in some regions in year
1, but had no statistically measurable effects on cost or use on
average in year 2. Since CareFirst’s incentive payments were
offered as fee-for-service enhancements, they were captured
by the claims data and spending calculations used in our
analysis. Therefore, the results we report should be construed
as net of participation fees. However, we do not have data on
the amount spent by CareFirst on the information and care
coordination infrastructure to implement the program. Our
estimates suggest that it did reduce medical spending compared to a control group by year 2 of implementation.

Table 3 Inpatient, Emergency Room, and Drug Expenditures – Annual Marginal Effects
IP allowed amount
Always PCMH
Intervention year1
Intervention year2
Intervention year3
Observations
2010 Annualized
spending per member ($)*

†

−9.6
[−16.83, −2.39]
−25.8‡
[−34.10, −17.41]
−23.0‡
[−34.96, −11.08]
21,008,072
456

Ever PCMH
†

−10.6
[−17.35, −3.94]
−23.3‡
[−29.87, −16.82]
−26.4‡
[−35.06, −17.87]
24,641,055
480

ER allowed amount

Rx allowed amount

Always PCMH

Ever PCMH

Always PCMH

Ever PCMH

−1.3
[−3.49, 0.81]
−6.1‡
[−8.48, −3.69]
−8.3‡
[−11.12, −5.41]
21,008,072
176

−0.7
[−2.72, −1.40]
−5.7‡
[−8.09, −3.28]
−8.3‡
[−11.42, −5.19]
24,641,055
184

2.0
[−3.47, 7.45]
−10.5‡
[−15.20, −5.83]
−14.3‡
[−19.63, −9.00]
21,008,072
516

−0.3
[−6.81, 6.13]
−10.2‡
[−15.19, −5.17]
−17.4‡
[−22.51, −12.38]
24,641,055
520

Two-part multivariate models controlling for: quarters by year, age, gender, no. of chronic conditions, illness burden, fully insured group, dependent
status, employer size, and county
* Calculated as 4 times the intervention group’s first quarter spending in 2010
95 % confidence intervals in brackets

†p <0.01, ‡p <0.001

ED emergency department, Rx prescription drug
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Table 4 Inpatient, Emergency Room, and Drug Expenditures,
Annual Marginal Effects – Chronic Group Only

Intervention
year1
Intervention
year2
Intervention
year3
Observations
2010 Annualized
spending per
member ($)*

IP allowed
amount

ER allowed
amount

Rx allowed
amount

Always
PCMH

Always
PCMH

Always
PCMH

−7.9
[−21.63,
5.80]
−35.8‡
[−52.50,
−19.01]
−32.0†
[−55.59,
−8.50]
10,459,
946
704

−1.8
[−4.89,
1.30]
−7.3‡
[−10.9,
-3.81]
−9.9‡
[−14.12,
−5.71]
10,459,
946
208

4.7
[−3.47,
7.45]
−12.2†
[−20.11,
−4.22]
−17.8‡
[−26.79,
−8.75]
10,459,
946
679

Two-part multivariate models controlling for: quarters by year, age,
gender, no. of chronic conditions, illness burden, fully insured group,
dependent status, employer size, and county
* Calculated as 4 times the intervention group’s first quarter spending in
2010
95 % confidence intervals in brackets

†p <0.01, ‡p <0.001

ED emergency department, Rx prescription drug

The one region in the CPCI demonstration that experienced
reductions in net spending in year 1 also experienced reductions in quality. Our study has not yet examined changes in
quality, but minimum thresholds of quality performance—as
measured mostly by claims data—were required for shared
savings bonuses to be awarded by CareFirst.
In contrast to the Massachusetts AQC intervention, which
was also associated with reductions in spending, 40 % of the
overall decline in spending in the CareFirst program is explained by reductions in inpatient care, emergency care, and
prescription drugs.
Table 5 Inpatient Admissions and Emergency Room Visits –
Annual Marginal Effects

Intervention year1
Intervention year2
Intervention year3
Observations
2010 Annualized IP
admissions/ER
visits per 1000*

IP admissions
(per 1000)

ER visits
(per 1000)

Always PCMH

Always PCMH

−0.55
[−1.37, −0.28]
−2.43‡
[−3.28, −1.56]
−2.35‡
[−3.38, −1.31]
21,008,072
96

−2.27
[−5.59, 1.05]
−8.36‡
[−11.62, −5.11]
−9.94‡
[−14.33, −5.54]
21,008,072
312

Zero-inflated negative binomial models controlling for: quarters by year,
age, gender, no. of chronic conditions, illness burden, fully insured
group, dependent status, employer size, and county
*Calculated as 4 times the intervention group’s first quarter amounts in
2010
95 % confidence intervals in brackets
†p <0.01, ‡p <0.001

ED emergency department, Rx prescription drug
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In our study, much of the reduction in inpatient and emergency care was explained by lower utilization of these services, indicating that the program may have succeeded in
encouraging primary care physicians to manage both admissions and emergency visits. This could be due to lower volume
of service, shifts to lower-priced settings, lower prices from
acute care providers worried about volume, or lower intensity
of services conditional on an admission or visit as a result of
more conservative practice styles of referred specialists.

CONCLUSION

Early experience shows that an intervention aimed at realigning
primary care practice incentives could be effective in curbing
spending growth and utilization. The intervention studied here
is noteworthy in that it avoided burdening participating practices with the costly infrastructure investments and short-term
downside risk that many other PCMH interventions have. As
such, the type of intervention studied here should appeal to
small practices in particular. Moreover, these results suggest
that some particular structural PCMH elements may not be
required for good results, which is a lesson that could inform
alternative payment models by other payers, such as Medicare.
Total spending declined more than the sum of reductions in
inpatient care, emergency room care, and prescription drugs. It
is possible that these extra reductions could be explained by
other covered services, including outpatient specialty care, laboratory tests, imaging, and home care, or by lower prices.
Lower spending on outpatient specialty care would point to
the possibility that referral management was an important contributor to the results reported here. The physician portal offered
by this program allowed primary care physicians to identify less
expensive specialists more easily. Future work should address
specialty care referral outcomes and quality outcomes.
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